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DESCRIPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIORS
JEFFREY A. BARRETT
Abstract. Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s
degrees of belief associated with hypotheses as one considers new evidence, but
they typically do not say how probabilities become associated with meaningful
hypotheses in the first place. Here we consider a variety of Skyrms-Lewis sig-
naling game [Lewis (1969)] [Skyrms (2010)] where simple descriptive language
and predictive practice and associated basic expectations coevolve. Rather
than assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses in a fixed language then con-
ditioning on new evidence, the agents begin with no meaningful language or
expectations then evolve to have expectations conditional on their descriptions
as they evolve to have meaningful descriptions for the purpose of successful
prediction. The model, then, provides a simple but concrete example of how
the process of evolving a descriptive language suitable for inquiry might also
provide agents with effective priors.
Description, Prediction, and Expectation
Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s degrees of
belief as one considers new evidence. On a Bayesian model, for example, one fixes
a descriptive language, sets coherent prior probabilities over a set of hypotheses
expressed in the language, then updates one’s degrees of belief as one conditions
on new evidence. While such an account of reflective inquiry has many virtues,
it has nothing to say concerning how to assign prior probabilities to meaningful
hypotheses. This is the problem of priors.
On reflection, one might, however, find the problem of priors itself puzzling.
While it is indeed unclear what procedure one should adopt in assigning prior
expectations to hypotheses expressed in a fixed descriptive language, it is similarly
unclear how one might ever come to use such a language without already having a
rich set of expectations. The symmetry of these reflections suggests a strategy.
We will consider how it might be possible for basic expectations to coevolve
with a simple descriptive language. More specifically, we will consider how simple
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descriptive and predictive practice might coevolve with basic expectations in the
context of a sender-predictor game, a variety of Skyrms-Lewis signaling game.1
Rather than assigning prior probabilities to hypotheses then conditioning on new
evidence, the modeled agents begin with no meaningful language or expectations,
then come to form basic expectations conditional on their simple descriptions as
they coevolve descriptions that may be used as the basis for successful prediction.
These basic conditional expectations reflect the degree of success in fact exhibited
in their descriptive and predictive practice and, as such, may evolve to inform other
decisions.
Reflective Bayesian inquiry is only possible for agents who have the capacity
to represent alternative possible states of the world and associate expectations
with these representations. The story here concerns how agents might evolve such
capacities in the first place. With regard to the problem of priors, it provides a
simple but concrete example of how the evolution of a descriptive language suitable
for coordinated prediction might also also provide a core set of well-tuned posterior
expectations that might then be available to play the role of priors should the agent
turn to reflective inquiry.
We will consider the story in three parts.
Part I: The Coevolution of Description and Prediction
A sender-predictor game is a variety of Skyrms-Lewis signaling game.2 In a
sender-predictor game, however, the agents coevolve both descriptive and predictive
dispositions. We will refer to these are the agents’ first-order dispositions. Their
second-order dispositions determine how they update their first-order dispositions
as they learn from experience.3
In a two-state/two-signal/two-act sender-predictor game, the sender observes a
prior state of nature, then sends a signal. The probability of particular signal being
sent is determined by the state of nature and the sender’s first-order dispositions.
1See [Lewis (1969)] for Lewis’ characterization of signaling games and [Skyrms (2006)],
[Skyrms (2010)], [Barrett (2009)], and [Barrett (2007)] for examples of such games in an evo-
lutionary context.
2David Lewis [Lewis (1969)] introduced signaling games in the context of classical game theory
as a way to study the possible nature of linguistic convention. Brian Skyrms [Skyrms (2006)]
[Skyrms (2010)] later considered Lewis’ signaling games in the context of evolutionary game theory.
Such evolutionary games have a number of virtues over Lewis’ conventional games as one need
not assume common knowledge nor any special rational faculties. Rather, the agents have only
simple conditional dispositions. The sender-predictor games described in the present paper were
coded and run as C++ simulations.
3The distinction between first- and second-order dispositions is less clear for agents who might
learn how to learn. The agents here are not so subtle. Also note that the evolutionary story
here involve the evolution of the dispositions of particular agents rather than the evolution of
types of agent in a population. It is often possible to translated results between such models. See
[Skyrms (2010)] for a discussion of this point.
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On observing the signal, the receiver performs a predictive action that is either
successful or unsuccessful depending on the posterior state of nature at a later
time. The probability of a particular predictive action being performed is deter-
mined by the signal and the predictor’s first-order dispositions. If the predictive
action is successful, which will depend on both the regularities exhibited by nature
and what counts as success for the agents as determined by their second-order dis-
positions, then the sender and predictor reinforce the first-order dispositions that
led to the action they just took conditional on the state of nature and the signal
type, respectively. If the predictive action is unsuccessful, they might weaken the
first-order dispositions that led to the actions they just took. Precisely how they
reinforce or weaken their first-order dispositions is determined by their second-order
dispositions.4
Consider a sender who checks the water temperature off Newport Pier each
morning. If the water is cooler than normal, she draws a ball from one urn; and
if it is warmer than normal, she draws a ball from another urn. Suppose that the
cool urn and the warm urn each initially contain one blue and one green ball. The
sender waves either a blue or green flag depending on the type of ball drawn. Her
predicting friend, standing on the beach on Catalina Island, sees the color of the
flag through his spyglass and draws a ball from an urn that corresponds to the flag
color. Suppose that each of the predictor’s urns begins with one ball each of two
predictive action types corresponding to going night fishing or to staying home to
repair fishing nets. He then performs the action corresponding to the type of ball he
drew. Night fishing is successful if there are clear skies that evening; staying home
to repair nets is successful if there is fog.5 If the predictive action is successful, then
each agent returns his ball to the urn from which it was drawn and adds a new
ball of the same type; otherwise, each agent simply returns his ball to the urn from
which it was drawn.6
4See [Barrett (2012)] for more details regarding the set-up and interpretation of such a games.
5 In terms of the endogenous norms of the model, all it means for a predictive action to be
successful is that, given the regularities between the prior and posterior states of nature and the
agent’s second-order dispositions to update their first-order dispositions, it produces an event
that in fact leads to a reinforcement of the agents’ first-order dispositions that led to the act.
Otherwise, the predictive action is unsuccessful.
6This sort of simple reinforcement learning was introduced by Herrnstein in his discussion
of the law of effect [Herrnstein (1970)]. More sophisticated learning dynamics also allow
for punishment and forgetting. They typically do much better than simple Herrnstein re-
inforcement in games like those discussed in this paper [Barrett and Zollman (2009)], and,
saliently, they often much better model the actual behavior of learners [Roth and Erev (1995)]
[Bereby-Meyer, Yoella and Erev (1998)]. The methodological thought is that Herrnstein reinforce-
ment learning requires only relatively weak dispositional resources and if it allows for successful
coordinated action in a particular context, then one can expect a broad class of more sophisticated
reinforcement dynamics to allow for similar success.
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Figure 1. The water-fog sender-predictor game
While the sender’s signals are initially meaningless and the receiver’s predictive
actions are correspondingly random, as the sender’s dispositions to signal condi-
tional on the state of nature and the receiver’s dispositions to act conditional on the
signal evolve, the sender’s signals become meaningful precisely insofar as they may
serve as the basis for successful coordinated predictive action. If there is in fact a
natural correlation between morning water temperature and evening weather, the
agents will be able to exploit this natural regularity for the purpose of success-
ful action if they are able to coevolve appropriately interrelated descriptive and
predictive dispositions.
Suppose that nature is such that the morning water temperature simply deter-
mines whether or not there will be fog in the evening. More specifically, suppose
that cool water guarantees clear weather and warm water guarantees fog. In this
case, if lower and higher than normal water temperatures are unbiased, indepen-
dent, and randomly distributed in nature, then, in this particular game, the agents
are guaranteed to coevolve successful descriptive and predictive dispositions in the
limit. When they do, one type of signal will almost always be sent when the water
is cool and will almost always lead to night fishing, and the other will almost always
be sent when the water is warm and will almost always lead to staying home to
repair nets.7
The game and the agents’ evolved behavior is more subtle when the relationship
between morning water temperature and evening fog is stochastic. This is also a
natural context to describe how well-tuned posterior expectations might coevolve
with the agents’ successful descriptive and predictive practice.
Part II: Tracking Predictive Success
Consider the following implementation of the stochastic water-fog game. The
sender has one urn for each possible prior state of nature labeled 0 and 1. Each of
her urns begins with one ball of each type of signal she might send labeled blue and
7The deterministic case is formally equivalent to a two-state/two-signal/two action signaling game.
See [Argiento, Pemantle, Skyrms, and Volkov (2009)] for a proof of convergence to a signaling
system in this case. If there are more than two states, signals, and actions or if nature is biased,
then the agents dispositions sometimes fail to converge to a signaling system. See [Barrett (2006)]
and [Huttegger (2007)] for discussions of such suboptimal pooling equilibria.
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green. The receiver has one urn corresponding to each possible signal type (color).
Each of his urns begins with one ball of each type of predictive action he might
take labeled 0′ and 1′.
Suppose that the prior states of nature are equally likely and randomly dis-
tributed. Suppose further that nature is such that when prior state 0 obtains, the
most likely posterior state is 0′, occurring with probability T00′ ; and when prior
state 1 obtains, the most likely posterior state is 1′, occurring with probability
T11′ . The probability of a transition from prior state 0 to posterior state 1
′ then is
T01′ = 1 − T00′ , and the probability of a transition from prior state 1 to posterior
state 0′ is T10′ = 1−T11′ . When the predictor gets a signal of type S and performs
an action of type A′, the action counts as a success for signal type S if and only if
the posterior state of nature is of type A.
Figure 2. Crossover probabilities representing natural statistical regularities
In this version of the game, we will suppose as before that the agents learn by
simple reinforcement. We will suppose further, however, that the predictor has
expectation weights associated with each possible signal type and that evolve by
bounded reinforcement with forgetting. More specifically, in addition to his action
urns, the predictor has an expectation urn for blue signals and an expectation urn
for green signals. Each expectation urn begins the game with a random assort-
ment of a thousand white and black balls. If an act is successful, in addition to
reinforcing the act he took, the predictor adds a white ball to the expectation urn
corresponding to the signal type he just used; if the act was unsuccessful, he adds a
black ball to that expectation urn. Then the predictor draws a ball at random out
of the expectation urn he just put a ball in, and discards it. This gradual random
forgetting maintains a constant number of balls in each expectation urn.
For now, we will simply suppose that the weight of white balls in each expec-
tation urn represents the degree to which the predictor expects that his predictive
action will be successful conditional on his receiving the corresponding signal. By
stipulation, then, if the sender’s signals evolve successful operational meanings for
the purpose of prediction, then the expectation weights will evolve to indicate the
predictor’s conditional expectations on meaningful descriptions of prior states.
On simulation, the sender and receiver begin by randomly signaling and pre-
dicting, and any initial success is the result of blind luck. Over time, however, the
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Figure 3. Water-fog game with expectations
agents very often learn to exploit the statistical regularities exhibited by nature.
And when they do, the predictor’s conditional expectations on the signal types typ-
ically coevolves to agree with the degree of predictive success the agents’ evolved
descriptive and predictive practice in fact affords.
In the symmetric case, where each prior state of nature is equally likely and the
failure of the most likely posterior state occurring is independent of the prior state
(i.e. T01′ = T10′ = T ), the agents nearly always evolve on simulation to signal and
to predict as well as theoretically possible.8 More specifically, the sender evolves
to associate a different signal type with each of the prior states and nearly always
sends that type of signal when the corresponding prior state obtains; and, when
the predictor receives the signal, he nearly always performs the predictive action
that has been most likely to occur when the prior state corresponding to the signal
has obtained.9
If clear weather has typically followed cool water and fog has typically followed
warm water, then the sender evolves to nearly always send one type of signal when-
ever she observes cool water and the other whenever she observes warm water;
and the predictor evolves to perform the predictive action that is most likely to
be successful on a clear evening when he receives the signal associated with cool
water and to perform the predictive action that is most likely to be successful on a
foggy evening when he receives the signal associated with warm water. The agents
then evolve a perfectly sharp descriptive language for prior states, their success rate
in predicting posterior states approaches the theoretically optimal rate of 1 − T ,
and the predictor comes to expect that the probability of an action being success-
ful, conditional on each signal, is 1 − T , which reflects the agents’ actual success
rate.10 In this case, then, the agents evolve to make the best possible predictions
8Suppose T01′ = T10′ = 0.25. The theoretically best possible success rate is 0.75. On simulation,
the agents evolve to do better than a success rate of 0.70 in 0.881 of the runs with 1×106 plays/run,
0.924 of the runs on 1× 107 plays/run, and 0.959 of the runs on 1× 108 plays/run with 1000 runs
in each case. And the predictor’s expectation conditional on each signal type evolves to agree well
with their actual relative frequency of successes on each signal type.
9The conjecture here is that this is true for the symmetric case as an extension of the results of
[Argiento, Pemantle, Skyrms, and Volkov (2009)].
10More precisely, the conditional expectations quickly evolve to approximate the agents’ actual
success rate, then fluctuate under the random mechanism for forgetting but spend most of their
time close to the actual evolving success rate.
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and their posterior conditional expectations in fact tell them just how reliable their
predictions are. Finally, significant to the problem of priors, the evolved condi-
tional expectations here are independent of the initial contents of the predictor’s
expectation urns. By the time the agents have evolved sharp meanings and clear
predictive dispositions, the initial configuration of the expectation urns has been
washed out under bounded reinforcement learning with random forgetting.11
In the asymmetric case, where the failure of the most likely posterior state occur-
ring depends on the prior state (i.e. T01′ 6= T10′), the simple-minded reinforcement
learning implemented by the simulated agents here may lead them to a suboptimal
equilibrium where they do not evolve to signal and predict as well as theoretically
possible. But if the statistical asymmetry is modest, even agents who learn in this
primitive way typically do evolve to signal and to predict as well as theoretically
possible. And when they do, they also coevolve conditional expectations that match
the asymmetric success rates for each of their evolved terms.12 In particular, the
receiver evolves to nearly always do predictive action 0′ on the signal that is sent
on prior state 0 and predictive action 1′ on the signal that is sent on prior state
1; and he also evolves to expect that his action will be successful with probability
T00′ = 1− T01′ in the first case and T11′ = 1− T10′ in the second.13
In both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, when successful, the agents co-
evolve intertwined linguistic and predictive dispositions. The signals are initially
meaningless and the predictions made on the basis of these signals are consequently
wildly unreliable. Successful prediction coevolves with the meanings of the signals,
and the predictor’s conditional expectation weights for the success of each type
of predictive action conditional on each signal type reflect the type and degree
of predictive success. Neither the evolved meaning of the agents’ descriptive lan-
guage nor their predictive dispositions nor the associated expectation weights are
11This is because bounded reinforcement learning with forgetting is much faster here at tracking
the evolving success rate than simple reinforcement learning is at evolving successful descriptive
and predictive dispositions. See [Barrett and Zollman (2009)] for a description of the relative
virtues of learning dynamics that incorporate a relatively strong variety of forgetting.
12Even when they agents do not evolve the make predictions in a theoretically optimal way, they
still do quite well. And, significantly for the issue of well-tuned expectations, their coevolved
conditional expectations track their actual degree of predictive success on each signal type for
both optimal and suboptimal evolutions. So while the agents may not know that their evolved
descriptive and predictive practices are suboptimal, they do know here how reliable the predictions
based on those practices are.
13Suppose T01′ = 0.25 and T10′ = 0. The theoretically best possible success rate is 0.875. On
simulation, the agents evolve to do better than a success rate of 0.825 in 0.751 of the runs with
1 × 106 plays/run, 0.777 of the runs on 1 × 107 plays/run, and 0.773 of the runs on 1 × 108
plays/run with 1000 runs in each case. A little less than a quarter of the time, then, the agents
fail to evolve those distinctions that would allow them to make optimal predictions. But when
they do evolve to capture the relevant distinctions, they also learn that the term associated with
prior state 0 leads to a successful predictive action about 0.75 of the time and the term associated
with prior state 1 nearly always leads to a successful predictive action.
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somehow prior; rather, the agents’ descriptive and predictive practice and their ex-
pectations are interdependent and forged by precisely the same empirical evidence
in the context of the same evolutionary process.
Since the predictor’s expectation weights typically do in fact track the type and
degree of predictive success afforded by the agents evolved language and predictive
practice, whatever that success may be, if their past relative frequencies of suc-
cessful coordinated prediction are representative of their future success, then their
expectation weights can be expected to reliably indicate what their expectations
should be.
Part III: How Expectation Weights May Evolve to Represent
Expectations
To this point we have simply supposed that the predictor’s expectation weights
represent the degree to which he expects that his predictive action will be successful
conditional on his receiving the corresponding signal, but one would like to be able
to tell a story concerning how expectation weights might come to play the role
of expectations even as they evolve to better track the coevolving success of the
agents’ evolving descriptive and predictive practice.
One might suppose that this is easily explained by the fact that the predictor
will do well when he uses his well-tuned expectation weights as expectations. The
thought is right, but to say precisely how predictor might evolve to use expectation
weights as expectations as opposed to doing something else, one must provide a
specific potential use for his evolving expectation weights and at least one alter-
native to his not using the expectations weights in the standard way. While no
concrete model can account for all of the behaviors an agent might exhibit or how
they might evolve, a very simple concrete is perhaps instructive.
Suppose that the predictor is not only interested in whether he should go fishing
or mend nets but also in making side wagers concerning the success of his predictive
actions. Suppose further that his second-order dispositions are such that he begins
by typically flipping a fair coin to determine whether he accepts a particular wager
at odds but that he also begins with a small positive probability of using expectation
weights as as if they were expectations to determine whether he accepts the wager.
Suppose that the probability that he will flip a coin or use expectation weights to
determine whether he accepts a wager in future plays increases or decreases slightly
proportional to his winnings when each method is used to regiment his behavior.
And, finally, suppose that the probability of regimenting his wagers in each way
always remains positive.
Such dispositions might be represented as follows. The predictor has a decision
urn that determines whether he flips a coin or uses expectation weights to regiment
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his betting behavior on a particular play. Specifically, the decision urn starts with
999, 999 balls that indicate that the predictor flip a coin and one ball that indicates
that he use expectation weights as expectations. When presented with a wager,
the predictor draws a ball from the decision urn. If the ball indicates that he flip
a coin, he does so and accepts the wager on heads, whatever it is. If the ball
indicates that he use expectation weights as expectations, he accepts a wager of a
of his dollars against b of his friend’s if and only if the ratio of the number of white
balls to the total number of balls in the relevant expectation urn is greater than
a/(a+b). Suppose that the stakes are always $10 and that each bet is whole valued
and randomly determined with equal likelihood.
Suppose that the contents of the decision urn evolve by proportional reinforce-
ment with forgetting. In particular, if the predictor flips a coin and wins the wager,
he adds b balls of the type that indicate that he flip a coin to the decision urn, then
he discards b balls from the urn at random. And if he flips a coin and loses, he adds
a balls of the type that indicate that he use expectation weights as expectations to
the decision urn, then discards a balls from the urn at random. Similarly, if the
predictor uses expectation weights as expectations and wins, he adds b balls of the
type that indicate that he use expectation weights as expectations to the decision
urn, then he discards b balls from the urn at random. And if he uses expectation
weights as expectations and loses, he adds a balls of the type that indicate that
he flip a coin to the decision urn, then discards a balls from the urn at random.
Finally, suppose that the agent never discards from the decision urn the last ball
of any type.
While there are now three interacting parts to the composite model, its behavior
is nevertheless relatively straightforward. As we have seen, if there are in fact reg-
ular statistical correlations between prior and posterior states, then the predictor
typically evolves to make the most accurate statistical predictions possible and the
expectation weights come to track how accurate his predictions are. Since expecta-
tion weights evolve to indicate the agents’ actual type and degree of success, when
they do, the predictor does better than even on average when he uses expectation
weights as expectations to determine whether to accept a wager. And since flipping
a fair coin leads to an unbiased acceptance of wagers and the wares offered are un-
biased, the predictor is always even on average when he flips to determine whether
to accept a wager. Hence the proportion of balls in the decision urn that indicate
that the predictor use expectation weights as expectations tends to increase over
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time. The result is that the predictor comes to spend most of the time with a high
probability of using expectation weights as expectations.14
It is perhaps worth making a final observation here for the sake of a modest
variety of completeness. One might consider allowing the predictor’s success on his
wagers to affect both the evolution of his use of expectation weights as expectations
and the evolution of the sender’s and predictor’s basic descriptive and predictive
behavior. The short story is that such models can in general behave in complex and
subtle ways. But if the effect of the outcome of each wager on the basic signaling
and prediction urns is sufficiently small relative to the reinforcements for successful
fishing or mending to begin (i.e. if the agents’ descriptive and predictive actions are
primarily in the service of making basic predictions rather than wagers to begin)
or if the chance that the predictor uses his expectation weights to decide whether
to accept a wager on a play of the game is sufficiently small and changes relatively
slowly to begin (i.e. if the aim is to explain how it is possible for expectation weights
gradually to evolve to be used as expectations), then it will behave much as the
model just described.
The upshot is that the agents end up with relatively stable, well-tuned expecta-
tion weights that typically get used as expectations without ever having assigned
anything like prior expectations over possible descriptions. Note, in particular,
that the expectation weights are not initially associated with descriptions insofar
as there are no meaningful descriptions to begin. Further, the expectation weights
do not initially represent expectations at all inasmuch as they only gradually come
to play such a role. Also salient to how one thinks of the expectation weights, since
they track the evolving descriptive and predictive practice faster than it evolves
here, any initial bias in the expectation weights washes out by the time the agents
evolve a successful descriptive and predictive practice.
Conclusion
The present model shows how it is possible for simple variety of descriptive and
predictive dispositions to coevolve with the formation of a simple variety of ex-
pectations. The agents’ descriptions are initially meaningless and their predictions
are hence wildly unreliable. Reinforcement learning allows for the coevolution of
successful descriptive and predictive practice and for the predictor’s expectation
weights to closely track the type and the degree of that success. And a reinforce-
ment model allow one to explain how such expectation weights might come to play
the role of expectations. Together they provide a account of how the successful
14Note, however, that since the predictor might use expectation weights as expectations to accept
a wager or flip a coin to accept a wager and win, and since neither type of ball is ever allowed to
go to extinction on the model, the predictor’s behavior is never fully stable.
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evolution of a simple descriptive language and associated predictive practice might
at the same time provide agents with simple core expectations.
On this story, neither the agents’ descriptive language nor their predictive dis-
positions nor the associated expectations are somehow prior. Rather, the agents’
descriptive and predictive practice and the expectations emerge together in the
context of the same evolutionary process.
The core posterior expectations that the agents acquire in the evolutionary pro-
cess are associated with those descriptions that were in fact used in making the
successful predictions as the descriptive and predictive practice evolved. Conse-
quently, they can be expected to be well-tuned to whatever predictive success in
fact allowed for the evolution of the descriptive language. Concerning the question
at hand, such core posterior expectations would be available to play the role of
prior probabilities should the agents turn to reflective inquiry.15
15I would like to thank Brian Skyrms, Jim Weatherall, and Seamus Bradley in particular for
helpful discussions on this topic.
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